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Debate over the merits of maintaining the American jury system
has long been a favorite subject of legal controversy. The literature
in the field is voluminous;' the discussion has been marked by bitter-
ness and exaggeration. 2 On the basic issue of the jury's merit as a fact
finder, both partisans and opponents argue that its distinctive charac-
teristics evidence either the enduring strengths or the inherent weak-
ness of the jury. Those who favor the system argue that twelve heads,
even of moderate intelligence, are better than one even of superior
intelligence. The collective memory and the common experiences of the
jurors, the proponents suggest, help the jury to comprehend, assess,
and recall what took place at trial. Those who oppose the system point
t BA. 1964 Stanford University; LL.B. 1969 Yale University. This review was originally
a Senior Studies paper submitted in the spring of 1969.
1. One commentator estimated three hundred articles have been written on the stbjett.
Broeder, Memorandum Regarding Jury System, Hearings on Recording of Jury Delibera.
tions Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Sectrity Act
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1955).
2. See Sebille, Trial by Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.BA.J. 53, 55 (1924):
Too long has the effete and sterile jury system been permitted to tug at the throat
of the Nation's judiciary as it sinks under the smothering deluge of the obloquy of
those it was designed to serve. Too long has ignorance been permitted to sit ensconced
in the places of judicial administration where knowledge is so sorely needed, Too
long has the lament of the Shakespearean character been echoed, "Justice has fled
to brutish beasts and men have lost their reason."
Or see LoRD DEVLIN, TRAL BY JURY 164 (1956):
Each jury is a little parliament. The jury sense is the parliamentary sense. I cannot
see the one dying and the other surviving. The first object of any tyrant in Whitehall
would be to make Parliament utterly subservient to his will, and the next to over-
throw or diminish trial by jury, for no tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom
in the hands of twelve of his countrymen. So that trial by jury is more than an
instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that
shows that freedom lives.
Senator James 0. Eastland, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the
Committee on the Judiciary, defended the exercise of his subcommittee jurisdiction to
investigate alleged jury "tapping" by members of the Chicago Jury Project: "The juris.
diction . . .arises from the fact that anything which undermines or threatens the Interity
of the jury system necessarily affects the internal security of the United States." Hearings,
supra note 1, at 1.
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out that jurors are not selected in a manner designed to maximize
their aggregate intelligence. Moreover, they operate in an emotion-
charged atmosphere not especially conducive to truth-seeking and,
in many jurisdictions, are not allowed to take notes on complicated
subjects or directly to ask questions of the witnesses.
The problem, of course, is that both the above arguments are valid.
Juries are not selected or allowed to function in a manner which max-
imizes their fact finding capacity. Yet, the assertion that twelve minds
acting collectively are better than one acting alone is not inherently
unreasonable. At this point, the issues are joined but not resolved.
The dialogue concerning many other important aspects of the jury
debate is equally inconclusive.3
An effective resolution of the issues framed in the traditional jury
debate requires much more knowledge about how juries actually
operate. We need to know whether juries find facts at least as well as
judges, and, if not, whether the jury serves other offsetting values. For
these reasons, the extensive empirical research conducted by the Chi-
cago Jury Project promised a breakthrough in the jury debate. By
applying the skills of social science to a major unresolved legal prob-
lem, the authors of this prolonged and massively financed study hoped
to replace speculation and conjecture with analysis and fact. Whether
or not this important purpose has been achieved is the subject of
this review.
The American Jury4 is the Chicago Jury Project's foremost publi-
cation. When it first appeared, Professor Abraham Goldstein de-
scribed it as "a graceful and sophisticated book.., of unquestioned
importance," a "detailed report on the extent to which judge and
jury disagree with one another in criminal cases, the reasons for the
disagreement, and the ways in which highly developed methodology
may be brought to bear on that problem."'5 Furthermore, "the details
of the research design, and the statistical treatment of the data, are
presented with remarkable lucidity. And the limitations of both data
8. For example, are jurors better able to judge the credibility of witnesses because they
can better "relate" to a witness who, like the juror, is in strange and unfhnuar surround-
ings for the first time? Or is the judge, because of his ability and experience, in a better
position to decide these matters? Are judges or juries more likely to be biased, corrupted
or narrow-minded? Does jury lawlessness" speed or impede legal reform? Do juries
by their alleged capriciousness cause the law to fall into disrespect? Or, by keeping the
administration of justice dose to the people, do they form the very basis of that respect?
Has the jury survived because it continues to play an important role--or is it an an-
achronistic relic which is waiting to be discarded?
4. H. KALVEN & H. ZEIsEL, THE ArMUa, AN Jua" (1966) (hereinafter cited as KAL 7
ZEIsEL).
5. Goldstein, Book Review, 1 L. & Soc'Y Ray. 148, 149, 151 (1967).
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and research design are, for the most part, set out with admirable
candor." 6 Judge Henry Friendly was even more enthusiastic. He
wrote that The American Jury is "a pioneering work ... the sort of
book that appears once in a decade."7 It is
a book to be savored and reread, not one to be gulped at a
single sitting. Brilliantly avoiding Professor T. R. Powell's barb
at the kind of research where "counters don't think and thinkers
don't count," it shows how, in the hands of imaginative scholars
and skillful writers, figures can enrich old insights and afford
new ones.8
Although this praise was punctuated occasionally by polite criticism
about such matters as the limitations of the sample or the limited
objectives of the study itself, the reviewers agreed that The American
jury represented an important contribution to realist jurisprudence.
A reassessment of The American Jury suggests that this conclusion
is unjustified. Kalven and Zeisel's data reveal little more than that
judge and jury reach a different verdict in one of every four cases.
Serious flaws in methodology gravely weaken the study's major con-
clusions. As a result, the jury debate remains almost as nonempirical
as it was prior to the publication of The American Jury.
I.
To answer the principal question, "when do trial by judge and
trial by jury lead to divergent results," the authors studied reports
of some 3,576 criminal trials held in the United States between 1954
and 1958. Questionnaires were returned by 555 Federal and state
court judges.9 Each judge was asked to report the jury's actual verdict
and, more significantly, to indicate the decision he would have reached
had he tried the case alone. The judges were also asked to supply
descriptive and evaluative material about the case, the parties, and
counsel. 10
The authors found that in 75.4% of the cases jury and judge
reached the same verdict, acquitting in 13.4% of the cases and convic-
6. Id. 148.
7. Friendly, Book Review, 33 U. Gin. L. Rzv. 884 (1966).
8. Id. 884-85.
9. For a full methodological breakdown, see KAL E & ZEISEL, ch. 3. Briefly, of the 8500
judges originally approached, 555 effectively cooperated. The remainder did not respond,
had no criminal trials, or did not cooperate for one reason or another. Half of the cases
were submitted by 15% of the judges.
10. Id. 45.
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ting in 62.0%. Almost all of the other condusions of the study are
based on the 25% of the cases in which the judge and jury disagreed.
In cases of disagreement, the jury was consistently more lenient than
the judge.11 The authors admit the figures are subject to conflicting
interpretations. The basic issue-how mud disagreement is too much
-is one for which "we lack a pre-existing context in which to place
the measurements."'1 2 They observe:
[t]o some, no doubt, the fact that judge and jury agree some 75%
of the time will be read as a reassuring sign of the competence
and stability of the jury system; to others the fact that they dis-
agree 25% of the time will be viewed as a disturbing sign of the
anarchy and eccentricity of the jury.'3
Other questions' 4 permitted Kalven and Zeisel to assign highly spe-
cific reasons to the individual instances of judge-jury disagreement.'5
Analyzing these reasons, they first combined similar cases in narrow
sub-categories, then expanded the sub-categories into larger catego-
ries. In the final stage of the "coding process," the data was organized
under five Reason Categories-Evidentiary Factors, Jury Sentiments
About the Law, Jury Sentiments About the Defendant, Disparity
of Counsel, and Facts Only the Judge Knew.'" On the basis of these
Reason Categories, the authors concluded that "unless at least one
of these factors is present in a case, the jury and judge will not dis-
agree."' 7 By weighting the frequency with which Reason Categories
were mentioned, they calculated that the causes of disagreement
occurred with the following frequency:18
Sentiments on the law 29%
Sentiments on the defendant 11%
Issues of evidence 54%
Facts only the judge knew 2%
Disparity of counsel 4%
100%
As a final step, the authors arranged their data in another profile.
11. Id. 61 n.8.
12. Id. 55.
13. Id. 57.
14. Actually the authors used two different questionnaires. The first asked longer, more
open-ended questions; the second shorter, more specific ones. Except when Sample II "re-
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By placing the evidence category to one side and combining the re-
maining four Reason Categories on the other, they classified the cases
by disagreement about facts and disagreement about values. The
results are summarized in Table 30:
Disagree On Per Cent
Facts alone 3
79%-Total facts
Values and Facts 45Vaus lne2 ( 66%-Total values
Values alone 21
Thus formulated, the data led the authors to the central conclusion
of their study: in nearly half the cases in which disagreement is found,
juries, under the guise of resolving difficult factual issues, are giving
rein to sympathies which the judge does not share. If the authors
are correct, we know "in the large, but with precision, the answer
to the question: what causes jury and judge to disagree."", From
other answers on the questionnaire, the authors conclude that the
jury's importation of values meets with the judges' approval. 20
II.
Unfortunately, the authors' data will not support the wide-ranging
interpretation argued for in The American Jury. Serious skepticism
is justified in light of the inadequacy of the sample and questionnaire,
reliance on "reason assessment," and the authors' use of unpersuasive
analogies and deductions.
For a variety of reasons, the sample used was not statistically ideal.
There was a distinct geographical imbalance in the trials reported.
No control was maintained over the time period in which the cases
being compared were tried. Judges were asked to give hypothetical
verdicts and thus, arguably, were free to be more "rule-minded" than
if human freedom had really been at stake. Almost complete reliance
was placed on self-selection of participating judges. "Extra help or
contacts to secure participation from a particular state"21 were also
employed. A small minority of the participating judges (15%), a
group already but a fraction of the judges contacted, submitted one-
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themselves frankly to these relatively minor difficulties. While such de-
fects are "theoretically impressive,"22 they alone do not account for The
American Jury's basic failings.
The authors' questionnaire raises much more substantial problems.
It was the sole instrument of communication between the 555 partic-
ipating judges and the authors. On the adequacy of the questionnaire,
the answers it elicited from participating judges, and the authors'
interpretation thereof, rests the entire validity of the conclusions
drawn in The American Jury.
Of paramount importance in this regard is the nature of the ques-
tions asked. The overwhelming majority of the questions were de-
scriptive. For example, the judge was asked, "As a person did [the
defendant] evoke sympathy?," or "Were there extenuating circum-
stances in this case? (no ... somewhat... decidedly.. .)," or "From
the factual evidence ... was the defendant's guilt or innocence very
clear? A close question . . ?," or "What is the community's sense of
justice with respect to this type of crime? (In complete accord with
the letter of the law... too severe ... not severe enough?)"23 In only
one question was the issue of what motivated the jury to disagree
with the judge specifically addressed. Question 34 read: "If you dis-
agree with the jury, what in your opinion was the main reason for
the jury's verdict?"(original emphasis).
Kalven and Zeisel did not, however, rely solely on answers to
Question 34 to explain judge-jury disagreements.2 4 In cases of dis-
agreement they also inferred reasons from the answers to essentially
descriptive questions. Thus, if the question "as a person did [the
defendant] evoke sympathy?" were answered in the affirmative, for
example, the authors listed as one reason for the disagreement "Jury
Sentiments about the Individual Defendant." Similarly, if the ques-
tion "what is the community's sense of justice with respect to this
type of crime?" were answered "regards the law as too severe," one
vote would be cast for "Jury Sentiments on the Law." No tally
was kept as to which reasons were a product of inference from
the answers to descriptive question and which resulted from the
judge's response to the one specific question which inquired as to
the "main reason for the jury's verdict."
There is a crucial difference between the question "As a person
22. Id. -d. 3.
23. The questionnaire is reprinted in id. 527.
24. Question 34 asked for the main reason for disagreement; in over half of the cases,
the authors found more than one reason category 
involed.
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did [the defendant] evoke sympathy?" and the question, "In your
opinion, did the defendant evoke such sympathy in the mind of the
jury as to influence them away from the weight of the evidence."
The former question, in addition to being somewhat ambiguous
(in whose mind did the defendant evoke sympathy-judge or jury
or both?) is simply descriptive. The latter is a specific, evaluative
question sharply focused on the issue about which the authors wished
the judge to respond. To ask the former question and then treat the
response as if it had been to the latter question is seriously to mislead
the reader as to the basis upon which the authors' conclusions are
founded.
Also disturbing are the means used by the authors to determine
if disagreement resulted from a contradictory resolution of a disputed
factual issue. The authors asked in question 12:
From the factual evidence in the case was the defendant's guilt
or innocence
1) very clear:
2) a close question whether or not he was guilty beyond a rea-
sonable doubt?
Evidentiary disagreement in these terms refers simply to the close-
ness of the case. Moreover, since the judge could only choose between
"very clear" and "close," the only common characteristic of all the
cases included in the latter category is that they were other than very
clear on the evidence.
Not surprisingly, by this measure, the authors found evidentiary
disagreement in four out of five cases of disagreement.2 5 The natural
follow-up question remains unasked, e.g., "In your opinion, was an
evidentiary disagreement responsible for the verdict?"
To use but one additional example, the inability of the question-
naire to detect jury sentiments on the law should be noted. The only
question directly dealing with this issue-which subsequently became
a Reason Category all by itself-is Question 15:
What is the community's sense of justice with respect to this
type of crime? (emphasis supplied)
1) In complete accord with the letter of the law
2) Regards the law as too severe
3) Regards the law as not severe enough
4) Don't know
The authors equated community sentiments with those of the
25. Id. 111.
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jury. Thus, the answer "regards the law as too severe" led the authors
to the conclusion that the disagreement was caused by "Jury Senti-
ments About the Law." This conclusion can be challenged on two
grounds. Although the jury is theoretically representative of the com-
munity, the community's sense of justice and that of an individual jury
(or juror) is not necessarily the same. Similarly, it is not unreason-
able to suggest that in most cases where the jury regards the law as
too severe, they will nevertheless honor their sworn duty to uphold the
law as given by the judge. Hence, their sentiment as to the severity of
the law will not necessarily lead to disagreement in result. It is clear
that the preferable question would have been: "Was the jury's sense of
justice with respect to this type of crime so much at odds with the letter
of the law as you instructed them, as to influence them away from the
weight of the evidence?"
In the 10% of the questionnaires in which the judge did not answer
either Question 34 or a sufficient number of descriptive questions to
allow the authors to infer an explanation, the authors used the factual
material supplied by the judge in his preliminary description of the
case to provide reasons for disagreement. Kalven and Zeisel claim that
the omission was often a matter of form or that the facts clearly pointed
to an explanation, even if the judge himself was mystified. They con-
clude:
In the end there are two things to emphasize about our intrusion
into the assessment process. First, the clues always came from some-
thing the judge himself had said and considered worth reporting.
Second, in view of our training and intense experience with the
questionnaires in the study, we acquired some degree of expertise
for the very special problem at hand.2-0
There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the judge considered
helpful facts offered in briefing the case as relevant to the issue of
what influenced the jury. Nor do the elementary facts in the judge's
brief provide any insight into the unreported facts which persuaded
the judge not to answer a particular question. These other factors
should carry as much weight as inferences drawn from factual state-
ments about the case written in a context unrelated to the issue of
judge-jury disagreement.
It should be emphasized that it makes a crucial difference what kind
of questions the authors were asking. Without any effort, moreover,
to compare the judges' descriptions in agreement versus disagreement
26. Id. 97.
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cases, Kalven and Zeisel never eliminated the possibility that the
characteristics they assigned to disagreement cases appeared in roughly
equal frequency in cases of agreement.
Despite the nature of the questionnaire the authors represent them-
selves as having asked the judge to supply specific reasons for disagree-
ment. This is the basis of "reason assessment," the name which the
authors gave to their methodology. As they define it, reason assessment
is
the assessment by a third party on an individual case by case
basis. It was the trial judge who was the third party assessor as he
gave his reasons for the causes of disagreement with the jury in the
case before him.27
In the use of this technique lies the basic weakness of The American
Jury. The authors anticipated attack on this fundamental aspect of
their work, but their attempt to explain away their difficulties is un-
convincing.
The authors admit that both the preferred technique and their
original strategy looked to a major use of "cross tabulation." This
simply means that important variables are isolated, i.e., everything but
the variable is held constant. This is done by grouping cases so that each
group shares as many common factual traits as possible. Differences in
outcome may then be attributed to traits not commonly shared. To
employ cross tabulation a massive amount of information is required
so that cases may be accurately grouped and the distinguishing charac-
teristics identified. Unfortunately, the authors' questionnaire did not
yield sufficient information to make this sort of study possible. As the
authors state:
The most surprising fact about the methodology of this study is
that our apparently secure expectations of relying on cross-tabula-
tion were largely, although not entirely, defeated.2 8
Thus the authors decided that "a different method was required
to locate the needed explanations." They invented "reason assessment,"
a "custom-made method with little precedent." General descriptive
questions suddenly became highly specific, evaluative questions.
To defend "reason assessment," Kalven and Zeisel argue that
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causes in studies of traffic accidents and motivational research in-
terviewing ....
[T]he novelty of our approach is that we combine the two
methods.-
The first analogy is ill-conceived. As the authors explain, in post-
accident investigations the expert's familiarity with "the performance
of automobiles, roads, and drivers, and the special configuration of post-
accident clues, yields distinctive insights into the particular case."'
Unlike the accident expert who deals with a limited number of physical
phenomena which are preserved for his careful and extended scrutiny,
a responding judge needed to cope with complex factual and personal
variables3 -- all within a few moments at the end of a long trial. The
authors acknowledge, moreover, that they do not know how many
judges, if any, actually interviewed jurors before answering the ques-
tionnaire.32 Furthermore, if the judges followed the authors' instruc-
tions and turned their attention to the questionnaire before the jury
returned, they lacked the most important datum of all-the jury
verdict.
The second analogy is equally inapposite. Motivational research
"seeks to establish reasons for individual acts by eliciting and analyzing
the actor's motives as spelled out in his own utterances."'' For rela-
tively simple decisions it has proven to be a "powerful research tool;"
but, as the authors state, "when the decision is a complex one, the
method quickly reaches its limits."34 As the authors learned in attempt-
ing to employ cross-tabulation, the jury process is indeed complex.
More serious is the fact that there is no evidence that the authors had
even indirect access to the jury's own statements. Further, the authors
admit that motivational research depends on the actor's knowledge of
his own motivations and on his willingness to disclose them.33 Yet, as
the authors acknowledge, 0 it is doubtful whether jurors fully under-
stand their own motivations, and it is clear, in any event, that they did
not disclose them.
The authors do not, however, rest their case on two misplaced
analogies. There are other "strong reasons why the trial judge can be
29. Id. 92-93.
50. Id. 92.
31. See id. 91 for an explanation of why cross-tabulation did not work.
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relied upon to locate the sources of judge-jury disagreement,"8 7 Having
the benefit of "continuous exposure to jury behavior" in general and
to the individual case, the judge is, Kalven and Zeisel argue, a "very
special observer,"38 who speaks with special authority about why the
jury disagreed with him.
The problem with this argument is that judges' opinions were not
subject to any corroboration. To illustrate the element of speculation
inherent in the authors' treatment of the judges' replies, one might
consider whether another judge and experienced counsel in the cases
studied by the authors could agree on what influenced the jury to
disagree with the judge, or whether two judges, independently observ-
ing the same case, could agree on what influenced the jury in reaching
its ultimate conclusions. Furthermore, the expertise possessed by ex-
perienced counsel and the bench may lead to a prediction of results,
but not to an explanation of the causes of disagreement.
Kalven and Zeisel also contend that since only cases of disagreement
were considered, the inquiry "gains a helpful directionality .... [O]ne
may expect in these cases a higher visibility of the jury's motives."80
The obvious question is, Why? Jury deliberations were equally secret
in cases of agreement and disagreement. Scrutinizing jurors in search
of a clue to the inner workings of their minds amounts at best to a
guess whose probability of success would not seem markedly changed
by the fact that ultimately the judge and jury reach different conclu-
sions. Furthermore, the judge did not know that the authors would
only consider cases of disagreement. Presumably the judge tried equally
hard to answer the authors' questions in all cases. Why he should be
more believable in one case than another is not immediately apparent.
The authors' last argument is that the reasons themselves are the
best evidence of the judge's ability to explain disagreements. Some of
the explanations are "totally obvious on the face of the questionnaire."
The judge often "has little difficulty empathizing with the jury." His
reasons are rarely "given in terms of general stereotypes;" and the study
reveals "highly individualized explanations for particular cases [which]
tend to fall into larger categories of explanation." 40
The fact that judges were specific in their description is, of course,
no proof that they were accurate. Expressed differently, an explana-
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it is correct. The assertion that the judge empathized with the jury in
an unspecified number of disagreements only suggests that tie judge
may have believed what he was saying. That the explanations tended
to fall into larger categories is simply evidence of the specificity of the
questionnaire and the breadth of the authors' categories; it is certainly
not evidence of the correctness of the judges' perceptions.
To gain a further insight into the accuracy of the judge's assessment
of what influenced the jury, the reviewer conducted an admittedly
artificial and limited empirical study of his own. Following each of
seven mock Yale Law School criminal trials, the judge and each of the
jurors was given a modified American Jury questionnaire. The jury
completed the questionnaires prior to their deliberations (which were
tape recorded). Thus the perceptions of the judge and the jury as
to the characteristics of the case, of the parties, and of counsel could be
compared. An analysis of the questionnaires reveals that judge and jury
disagreed on half the questions. The jury generally thought the cases
were harder and closer than did the judge. They were more likely to
perceive extenuating circumstances. Contrary to The American Jury's
findings, the jury was much less likely than the judge to perceive the
defendant as "evoking sympathy." A wide disparity appeared in the
assessment of the effectiveness of counsel. The judges found an im-
balance in only one case, the jury in all but one. The percentage and
direction of disagreement on guilt or innocence was almost identical
to The American Jury. Judge and jury agreed in five of seven cases, and
in both cases of disagreement, the jury was more lenient than the judge.
Nonetheless, the serious deviation in the judge's and jury's perception
of the case is further evidence that the basic assumption of The Amer-
ican Jury is seriously suspect. Rather than explaining disagreements
in terms of sympathy for the defendant or against the law, the ques-
tionnaires and the tape recorded deliberations reveal that the juries
were primarily concerned with the matter of reasonable doubt.
III.
In addition to presenting an explanation, however questionable, for
disagreement between judges and juries, Kalven and Zeisel claim that
their data show that juries are capable fact finders in that they render
verdicts which follow the weight and direction of the evidence. The
authors acknowledge that their study is not designed to test the fact-
finding ability of the jury, but characterize their conclusions as a
beneficial by-product of their broad research design.4'
41. Id. 151-52.
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The authors advance four arguments to support their contention
that "the jury does by and large understand the facts and get the case
straight." First they contend that agreement is too frequent to be con-
sistent with the "hypothesis of substantial jury misunderstanding."42
If the jury does not understand, agreement with the judge would be a
matter of chance; that is, it will occur in half the cases. Agreement in
three out of four cases studied makes it improbable that much agree-
ment was produced by chance. Furthermore the disagreement is highly
directional, "thus compelling the conclusion that misunderstanding
cannot in and of itself be a major factor in causing judge-jury disagree-
ment."43
That disagreement is directional hardly compels the conclusion that
the jury understands-it may suggest the opposite. Confusion and mis-
understanding often generate doubts which, given the presumption of
innocence, tend to benefit the defense. This is, of course, the "direc-
tion" of the disagreement found by the authors.
That judge and jury agree in three-quarters of the cases also does
not prove the jury understands. This conclusion presumes that the
judge is always right. Suppose, moreover, that the jury understands
half the time and misunderstands the other half. Assuming that in the
half which they understand, they agree with the judge and that in the
other half agreement is a product of chance, a total agreement of 75%
would result, which is precisely what the study reveals.
Second, in 90% of the disagreement cases, the authors found a rea-
son which constituted a "plausible explanation" for the disagreement.
This, the authors suggest, "by its nature, precludes the notion that the
jury did not understand the case." 44 Furthermore, with the exception
of white-collar crime, e.g., embezzlement, the judge "almost never ad-
vances the inability of the jury to understand as a reason for disagree-
ment."45
The fact that the judge seldom proffered the jury's inability to un-
derstand as a reason for disagreement is more a comment on the
authors' questionnaire than on the content of the judge's responses.
(The judge was never specifically asked if the jury understood the
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Third, the authors suggest that the large majority of criminal cases
are easy to comprehend. The judge was asked the following question:




very difficult to comprehend?
Responses indicated that judges rated 86% "easy," 12% "somewhat
difficult," and only 2% as "very difficult." Thus, the authors conclude,
"the great bulk of cases are routine as to comprehension and hence
unlikely to be misunderstood."401
That 86% of the cases studied were rated by the judge as being of
the same level of difficulty says absolutely nothing about how the
average jury views the evidence in the day-to-day criminal case. For
all that is known (referred to, supra, and the limited empirical study
this suggests), the jury may find the average criminal case difficult to
follow.
Fourth, Kalven and Zeisel argue for jury comprehension from the
fact that the jury does not disagree with the judge any more frequently
in cases it perceives as difficult than in cases it perceives as easy. If
the jury has a tendency to misunderstand, it will most likely do so, and
thus agree with the judge only by chance in the cases it perceives as
difficult. The disagreement rate, however, turns out to be about the
same in the "hard" as in the "easy" cases. This, according to Kalven
and Zeisel, is "a stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury
does not understand."47
The authors' conclusions are questionable since the indicators of
jury perception they employ-the frequency wsith which the jury returns
to the judge for guidance, and the length of jury deliberations-are
unreliable. As regards the jury return rate, the authors note that it is
"surprising how infrequently" the jury returns to the judge for help.
Furthermore, most inquiries are of a legal nature.48 Thus the jury
"return rate" is a more accurate indicator of the jury's difficulty with
the law rather than with the evidence in a given case. Moreover, the
authors' examples "of (evidentiary) questions that bother the jury" do
not lead one to conclude that such questions accurately indicate the
46. Id. 154.
47. Id. 157.
48. See id. 511, Table 144.
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difficulty of the case.49 The argument derived from jury deliberation
time is more substantial, but whether this one statistic supports the
weight of the authors' conclusion is dubious.
The proposition that the jury is a capable fact-finder is indirectly
supported by the finding that verdicts move with the weight and
direction of the evidence.50 The authors' figures may suggest move-
ment in the right general direction but, assuming arguendo that the
judge is always right, they are also consistent with a considerable
amount of jury confusion.
The evidence produced by The American Jury on the jury's relia-
bility as fact-finder, is, therefore, only tentative. The study was not de-
signed to illuminate the problem, and the authors' assertions are based
upon often unjustified inferences from the data.
IV.
Kalven and Zeisel assert that the responses to their questionnaire con-
stitute "the judge's decisive ballot on how well the jury system is per-
forming."5' As the authors interpret the data, the striking point is that
the judge is critical of the jury's performance in only 9% of the total
cases and only one-third of the disagreement cases. The judge is critical
of only 15% of the Fact disagreements, 25% of the Fact-Value disagree-
ments, and 78% of the Values alone disagreements. From these figures,
the authors conclude that "for the judge as well as for the jury,
evidentiary ambiguity legitimates the importation of values."5 2
49. See id. 511; the examples are requests for more testimony, a dictionary, knowl-
edge of the defendant's record, and the reason a witness had failed to give an Item of
information.
50. The authors' conclusion that the jury acquits more frequently in cases favorable
to the defendant and convicts more frequently in cases favorable to the prosecution it
based upon a combination of the judge's hypothetical verdict and his observation ot
whether the case was "dear" or "dose." Id. 159, Table 51.
JuRY AcQurrrAL IN CLEAR AND CLOSE CASES
1 2 3 4
Clear cases- Close cases- Close cases- Clear cases-judge acquits judge acquits judge convicts judge convicts
Jury acquits 95% 74% 46 0 10%
Number of Cases 60 142 374 615
It is fair to ask which is the more impressive figure-that the jury conviction rate rises
from 26% to 54% from category 2 to category 3--or that the disagreement rate In the two
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But do the figures tell us what Kalven and Zeisel claim?
In Sample II the judge was asked the following question:
5. Do you feel that the jury's verdict was (check one)
1) without any merit?
2) a tenable position for a jury to take, though not for a judge?





Tenable for a jury, untenable for a judge 14%
One a judge might come to 8%
Correct 69%
100%
The authors interpret all answers other than "without merit" as
endorsements of the verdict. The rationale for this procedure is not
immediately apparent. In cases of disagreement, the judge is given a
choice of three characterizations for the jury's action. The first involves
narrow ground indeed-the verdict must be without any merit and
diametrically at odds with the evidence. The second states that it would
be untenable for a judge to reach the conclusion in question, but im-
plies that there may be a reason why a jury might reach such a con-
clusion. What the "some reason" is, of course, remains unknown.
Necessarily it must involve a value judgment, or at least a conclusion
based on the judge's experience, about how the jury either should or
does operate. A judge may well feel that a verdict is tenable for a jury
because he believes juries are generally not very astute and thus more
cannot be expected of them. Such an answer need not be, and probably
is not, an endorsement of the verdict.
The judge would, in this view of the 14% figure, be critical of the
jury's verdict in 23% of all cases--and in 78% of all disagreements.
The point, of course, is that either assumption might be justified and,
seen in this light, we hardly have any "decisive" word from the judges
on how they feel about judge-jury disagreement.
V.
Unfortunately we know little more today about the central issues
involved in the traditional jury debate than we knew before The
American Jury. Though the authors assert that they have explained "in
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the large, but with precision" when and why judge and jury disagree,
in fact they have told us little more than that judge and jury decide
once in four cases differently. As they acknowledged, this datum is not
particularly useful. We don't know for certain who is correct-judge
or jury. Even if we did, we lack a context in which to decide how much
disagreement is too much. Furthermore, we have not been given a
convincing explanation of why judges and juries disagree.
The misfortune is that, properly used, the authors' data might have
been helpful indeed. Had they used only the answer to Question 34,
we would at least have known the judges' explanations for their dis-
agreements with the jury. But the answers to Question 84 were supple-
mented by a different type of analysis-inferences based on answers to
descriptive questions were used in lieu of explanations. The essential
problem with the study, then, is that the authors have commingled two
very different methods. The judges' direct explanations are adulterated
by inferences and explanations provided by the authors. And the
authors' inferences based on descriptive questions are useless, because
the frequency of occurrence of these characteristics in agreement and
disagreement cases is not compared.
It is submitted therefore that The American Jury, the most ambi-
tious attempt to date to answer one of the most fundamental, persistent
questions in the administration of criminal justice, is a serious failure.
Though an effort to replace speculation and conjecture with analysis
and fact, The American Jury adds little that is new to the jury debate.
A Constitution for Every Man
William Van Alstynet
Everyman's Constitution. By Howard Jay Graham. Madison: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1968. Pp. xiv, 631. $12.95.
It may be exceptional to introduce a review of one man's book by
beginning with a reference to a different author, but the unorthodoxy
will save a great deal of time. Leonard Levy, professor of constitutional
history at Brandeis University, has published several justly famous
recent works including The Legacy of Suppression (an historical treat-
ment of unfree speech), Jefferson on Civil Liberties, and The Origin
t Professor of Law, Duke University.
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of the Fifth Amendment. The last, an unhurried review of the evolu-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination, earned a Pulitzer prize
last year. Levy's brand is skeptical and liberal, and just now he domi-
nates the field of constitutional historians.
All the more reason, therefore, to pay attention to the Foreword to
Howard Jay Graham's Everyman's Constitution, as it is written by
Professor Levy and it assesses Graham's collected works in the following
way:
.The year 1968 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. A most fitting commemora-
tion of that centennial is this collection of essays by Howard Jay
Graham, who is surely the greatest authority on the history of the
amendment. He is its Maitland, and perhaps our foremost living
historian of American constitutional law as well.1
Howard Jay Graham has played an important part in the devel-
oping history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even as he chronicled
its origins and purposes, he influenced its interpretation. By no
coincidence, substantive due process of law as the mainstay of deci-
sions against the constitutionality of government regulation came
to an end when Graham provided the scholarly proof that the
amendment was not designed to benefit business enterprise. Simi-
larly, when he showed that the amendment emerged from the
efforts of its framers to ensure that Negroes should have the same
rights as other citizens, he provided the historical basis for deci-
sions, which rapidly followed, in support of equal rights regardless
of race.2
And that, in brief, is a pretty fair review of Everyman's Constitution.
The book assembles eleven articles previously published in various law
reviews over a period of thirty years, adds two new chapters, and
bridges the separations with editorial comment. The result is a smooth
and comprehensive treatment of important fourteenth amendment his-
tory. Its concern is seemingly with two discrete subjects, but in fact it
presents a conscientious historian's brief for one principal theme.
The early chapters revisit the conspiracy theory of the fourteenth
amendment that corporations were intended to be protected by the
due process clause-a theory most familiary associated with Roscoe
Conkling's argument in San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R.,3
and enlarged upon by the books of Charles and Mary Beard who ad-
1. Levy, Foreword to H. GRAHAir, EvEmxvac.'s CoNsrrruroN at vii (1968).
2. Id. at vii-viii.
3. 116 US. 138 (1885). Conkling's argument is reproduced in full in Appendix I to H.
Ga,.tAr, supra note 1, at 594-610.
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vanced an even broader economic interpretation of the Constitution.4
The point of these early chapters, however, is not to analyze the
narrow and currently uninteresting problem of whether corporations
were in fact secretly intended to be included as persons entitled to sub-
stantive due process protection under the fourteenth amendment. It is,
rather, to move from a careful examination of the evidence respecting
that alleged secret understanding to the broader question of con-
spiracy: was the fourteenth amendment principally the product of
selfish business interests? Was it designed to smuggle in a constitutional
basis for protecting economic interests from social regulation by means
of judicial review? Were abolitionist concerns, in fact, a mere front
that provided the facade but not the real function of the fourteenth
amendment?
Graham's powerful (and successful) effort to exorcise this demonic
theory is reinforced and complemented by the succeeding chapters on
his second subject-the impact of the abolitionists on the formation of
the fourteenth amendment. Together with ten Broek's The Antislavery
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 Graham's one hundred page
chapter on the antislavery backgrounds of the fourteenth amendment
(which originally appeared in 1950,0 a year earlier than ten Broek's
work) effectively rehabilitates the humanity of the fourteenth amend-
ment-the amendment was indeed a constitutional commitment to
equal rights, precisely as the Supreme Court initially interpreted it
before veering away in favor of business interests for the next half
century.7
Beyond this, Graham's chapter titled Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth
Amendment does much to aid our understanding of a continuing prob.
lem in the use of historical materials to interpret the amendment.
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has
appeared to encourage the use of historical research in aid of deter-
mining whether each alleged form of discrimination was or was not
understood to be forbidden by the equal protection clause. In calling
for reargument in 1953,8 the Court asked counsel to determine whether
Congress and the state legislatures contemplated that the fourteenth
amendment would abolish segregation in public schools. It also asked
4. See, e.g., 2 C. BEARD & M. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATIoN 111-14 (1928).
5. J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FoURTEENTIa AMENDMENT (1951),
6. Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts.
1 & 2), 1950 Wis L. REV. 479, 610.
7. See the emphatic dicta of Mr. Justice Strong in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S,
303 (1879) and Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
8. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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whether, assuming that the immediate abolition of segration was not
contemplated, the framers nevertheless understood that Congress or
the Court would, under future conditions, have power to abolish
segregation. Similar references to particular "understandings" were also
diligently pursued in the reapportionment cases,9 the poll tax' and
literacy test11 cases, and the antimiscegenation decision. 12 In each in-
stance, the ensuing decision has been subject to considerable criticism
-that whatever the liberal virtues of the results, they are insupport-
able in terms of the framers' original understanding. Mr. Justice Har-
lan's elaborate dissent in Reynolds' 3 is particularly caustic on this
point, and the many articles by Alfred Avins14 carry the criticism for-
ward on every other front.
Graham's writing on "Our 'Declaratory' Fourteenth Amendment,"
however, effectively supports the wisdom of the second of the two
questions posed by the Court in the 1953 Brown decision: not the one
respecting immediate changes that the framers understood must ensue
at once from ratification of the fourteenth amendment, but the one
respecting Congress's (and the Court's) prerogative, if any, to enlarge
upon those changes under future conditions. In Brown itself, the
Court concluded conservatively that the evidence on this matter was
inconclusive, and so the case was resolved almost entirely on other
bases. Graham's writing is more aggressive in this respect. He argues
that, in keeping with the open texture of the amendments language,
the animating spirit of the amendment was thematic and ideological,
rather than detailed and legislative. The amendment thus embraced a
capacity for growth in the particular application of its broad norms,
rather than seeking to settle for all time a fixed and legislated answer
to each possible controversy in terms of the conditions, perceptions,
and information of 1866. To a large extent, this position is shared by
Professor Bickel,15 and by Professor Kelly.' Understanding of this
view makes less unnerving the statement by Mr. Justice Douglas in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, that: "Notions of what consti-
9. See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
10. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
11. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
12. Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1 (1967).
13. 377 U.S. at 589.
14. See, e.g., Avins, The Right to Hold Public Office and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments: The Original Understanding, 15 U. or KAN. L. REv'. 287 (1967).
15. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HAnv.
L. REvy. 1, 62 (1955).
16. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SurEnmm Courr REaymy
119, 134 (1965); Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered, 54 Mcn. L RE%'. 1049,
1083-86 (1956).
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tutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change."17
Graham does not bemoan the activism of the Supreme Court in its
aggressive use of the fourteenth amendment to protect economic con-
cerns. Rather, his is a more measured observation of heavy irony-viz.,
that the Court was most creative during the first half-century of the
fourteenth amendment in areas of least importance to the amend-
ment's origin and animating spirit, even while it was willfully un-
creative in areas of the amendment's basic drive. Thus, his suggestion
in the preface:
My thesis is simply that what the United States, under these guar-
antees, did for itself, and for corporations, in curbing manifest and
latent hostility and antagonism to corporate enterprise, 1880-1940,
the United States can and must do for itself, and for still disadvan-
taged minorities, using the same techniques and weapons, supply-
ing similar, and, in this case, intended process and protection. 8
The thought is not ill-considered as an historian's suggestion in
righting history. Much of the Court's early development of substantive
due process against local regulation of corporate interests was, after
all, the product of Mr. Justice Field whose lack of interest in the
amendment's abolitionist underpinnings may be partly understood
from a segment of a letter he wrote to 'Professor Pomeroy, in 1882:
"You know I belong to the class, who repudiate the doctrine that this
country was made for the people of all races. On the contrary, I think
it is for our race-the Caucasian race." 19 Yet, far more of the actual
formation of the fourteenth amendment was the product of men like
Thaddeus Stephens who, dying just three weeks after the fourteenth
amendment was proclaimed as ratified, was buried in a plain grave.
yard in Pennsylvania beneath this epitaph:
I repose in this quiet and secluded spot,
Not from any natural preference for solitude
But, finding other Cemeteries limited as to Race by Charter Rules,
I have chosen this that I might illustrate in my death
The principles which I advocated Through a long life:
EQUALITY OF MAN BEFORE HIS CREATOR."
Mr. Justice Field having exercised a constitutional compassion for in-
terests of enterprise during the longest tenure of any man in the his-
17. 383 U.S. at 669.
18. H. GaAnAm, supra note 1, at ix.
19. H. Ga.AHlw, supra note 1, at 195.
20. F. BROME, THADDEUS STEVENS 366 (1959).
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tory of the Court, it may not be amiss in the last half of this different
century that the Court has also exercised a constitutional compassion
of the sort reflected in Thaddeus Stephens' epitaph.
And this, of course, is the explanation of the title of Howard Jay
Graham's book. It is not Everyman's Constitution in the sense of be-
ing a layman's guide through highlights of the Constitution. It is,
rather, a more technical but highly readable review of the fourteenth
amendment's origins in support of the thesis that the amendment is
itself a Constitution meant for everyone.
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